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I have great sympathy with the thoughts of Lipton and
Ødegaard [1] – the assessment and communication of
"causal" associations is a source of continual frustration
for epidemiologists. The authors' lucid account of the use
of causal language in epidemiology can essentially (if
rather unflatteringly) be simplified to the following: it is
impossible to prove that X causes Y; the statement "Smok-
ing causes lung cancer" is thus no more informative than
the statement "Smoking two packs a day for N years increases
your risk of lung cancer ten-fold". In fact, it is less informa-
tive and even misleading. The authors argue that such
causal statements are redundant, logically indefensible
and should be avoided in favour of more detailed descrip-
tions of the process by which such associations are estab-
lished (the "story", as the authors put it). The latter are, in
themselves, sufficient causal statements (the notion of
"letting the data speak for themselves") and nothing is
gained by making subjective attributions of causality.
It is, of course, difficult to argue with such reasoning. Sen-
sible epidemiologists would shy away from stating that a
particular X causes a particular Y, because they know that,
in purely statistical terms, there is always a possibility that
they could be wrong. There is, in fact, much with which I
agree in Lipton and Ødegaard's paper. To their call for
"telling a good story", which they argue lies "not in the
naming of something as causal, but in the actual rigor of
the analysis" [1] (p8), I would add that it is not just rigour
in the analysis that is required, but also rigour in asking
good questions involving testable hypotheses, rigour in
study design and execution, and rigour in the description
of results. There are, however, notable points on which I
disagree. The authors begin with a short caveat, claiming
not to attempt "to revisit the long-standing debate
between realism and pragmatism in science". I find this
somewhat strange as, to me, this issue is at the crux of the
argument. The common description of epidemiology as a
"pragmatic" science is rather unfortunate. The term "prag-
matic" suggests some form of compromise between objec-
tive "realism" and the vicissitudes of everyday life (see
Appendix Footnote 1). This is somewhat ironic; I see no
compromise in epidemiology as a field that applies scien-
tific methods, however imperfect, to study everyday prob-
lems with the ultimate aim of improving the health of
individuals and populations. Acceptance of its imperfec-
tions is, on the other hand, a very "realist" attitude. In a
very "pragmatic" sense then, the epidemiologist can say
that, having assessed the available evidence, smoking is a
cause of lung cancer. The philosopher, however (and I say
this meaning no disrespect to the field), can say nothing
about any causal link between smoking and lung cancer –
either in the "pragmatic" or objective senses – other than
the fact that they can say nothing about any causal link
between smoking and lung cancer (and, indeed, gener-
ally). Lipton and Ødegaard do seem to accept this "prag-
matic" role of epidemiology, as they assert that they are
interested in "the ability to manipulate the world, to pre-
dict and intervene" [1] (p3), but do not feel that this is rel-
evant to their discussion of causation in epidemiology.
My main difficulty with Lipton and Ødegaard's position
perhaps stems from my love of the written language. The
ability to string words together on a piece of paper to
inspire a sense of knowledge, excitement, wonder, sadness
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or depression in someone perhaps sitting thousands of
miles away whom you may never have met is without
doubt one of the most honourable and worthwhile of
human activities. A whisper in someone's ear, a casual
conversation, a speech at a convention are all eventually
lost to dispersing airwaves or adulterated by time and
memory. A well-constructed written sentence is, at least in
principle, timeless.
It is from this rather romantic perspective that I find
myself pained by the awkwardness with which epidemiol-
ogists must describe associations between exposures and
health outcomes. The term "cause" is steeped in great his-
tory and philosophy; it is used to describe an objective
ideal by which one event invariably leads to another, and
as such is often thought to have limited use in our every-
day world.
Imagine the Aristotelian notions of an "ideal" universe,
made up of perfect geometrical bodies, and the observable
"real" universe, an imperfect approximation of the ideal
in which, for example, spherical bodies appear to be
spheres, but upon closer examination are shown, by
nature of their imperfection, to be made up of flat sur-
faces. This (admittedly somewhat naïve) scenario pro-
vides us with a visual analogy of how epidemiologists
might view the world. There is, we suspect, an ideal, true,
but unobservable "causal" association between X and Y.
As with other scientific fields, we aim to model this ideal
universe using our imperfect methods and, from our
ensuing observations, make some sort of inference about
the true causal association. The question then becomes
how closely our imperfect models resemble the ideal uni-
verse they are intended to reflect – if you like, how small
the area of those flat surfaces that make up those spherical
bodies is. The smaller the surfaces, the smaller the error in
our observations, and the closer our imperfect geometrical
representations will resemble perfect spherical bodies.
Lipton and Ødegaard argue that the concept of causation
in the ideal universe, by nature of its being unobservable,
is irrelevant. One might even wonder whether causation
even exists at all in the ideal universe; maybe things just
"happen". Consider two identical twins who share in
common not just their genetic make-up, but everything
else in their lives. They live in the same house, eat exactly
the same foods, have the same jobs, think the same
thoughts at the same time; in fact, at any given point in
time, the two are completely interchangeable. This is per-
haps the closest we could ever get to a real interpretation
of our ideal universe. Suppose both twins take up smok-
ing two packs of cigarettes a day at the age of 20, which
they smoke at exactly the same times. Both then go on to
develop lung cancer at the age of 50. The fact that they
have been smoking two packs of cigarettes every day for
the past 30 years would give us no information as to
whether their lung cancer was caused by smoking, in
much the same way as their age, sex, occupation, genetic
make-up or any of the other factors that the twins share in
common (which is everything) would tell us nothing
about the cause of their lung cancer. Suppose, however,
that only one of the twins had taken up smoking. Only the
smoker goes on to develop lung cancer at the age of 50 (I
ignore the possible effects of passive smoking here). I
imagine that most people would be prepared to bet good
money on smoking being the cause of the smoker's cancer
in this case, since it is the only factor that distinguishes the
twins. But what if both twins had taken up smoking and
only one subsequently developed lung cancer? Again, we
would be in a quagmire as to what to say about smoking
as a cause of lung cancer. We might venture to say that, all
else being equal, smoking induces cancer with a certain
probability. Of course, in the ideal universe nothing is
ever equal, for that would require two instances of the
same type of event occurring in the same place at the same
time, and all the preceding events for the two events to
have occurred in exactly the same point in space-time,
apart from the one that was subsequently termed the
"cause". Asserting that this one cause effects the outcome
with a certain probability would be tantamount to saying
that God does indeed play dice, a question perhaps best
left to quantum physicists. I imagine, however, that most
epidemiologists would not be prepared to accept such an
interpretation. After all, our observations tell us that
things do not occur at random; health outcomes cluster
among individuals with certain characteristics, and it
seems unreasonable to suggest that if smoking were not a
true cause of lung cancer, we should repeatedly observe
this association simply by chance. Our idea of causation is
based on a belief that we can assign individuals into
groups with certain common, relevant characteristics, dis-
regarding factors that we judge to be uninformative about
a given association and, therefore, ignorable. Otherwise,
the notion of causation does not make sense. That we, as
epidemiologists, have this belief attests to its being rele-
vant and important, regardless of whether it is unobserva-
ble.
It is here that I find a frank contradiction in Lipton and
Ødegaard's argument. They agree that the concept of cau-
sation is important in epidemiology, and even agree that
terms commonly used to imply causal relationships, such
as "X increases the risk of Y by" can be used in much the
same sense as "X causes Y" [1] (p5). The authors do not
seem to be objecting to the use of the term "cause" on the
grounds it describes something that is qualitatively differ-
ent. It is thus hard to see what they find so disagreeable
about its use. Perhaps they simply do not like the word
"cause", preferring instead more descriptive associational
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statements that they nevertheless seem to agree amount to
qualitatively the same thing.
Lipton and Ødegaard's assertion that statements of associ-
ation between exposures and outcomes are in themselves
sufficient causal statements is based on the strong
assumption that, for any two given associational state-
ments, the degree of evidence is equivalent – that the flat
surfaces making up those imperfect spheres are of equal
area. I doubt, however, whether most epidemiologists
would lend equal weight to any pair of causal statements,
such as "Smoking X packs a day for N years increases your risk
of lung cancer by Y times" and "Living within X miles of a
mobile phone pylon for N years increases your risk of brain can-
cer by Y times", for any given range of X and Y values. Lip-
ton and Ødegaard thus argue for better stories, better
accounts of study designs, data collection and analysis
and more detailed discussion of confounding and poten-
tial biases. This is, of course, to be welcomed, as any such
increase in rigour can only serve to improve accuracy and
precision in describing our observations (see Appendix
Footnote 2). However, this still leaves us with the prob-
lem of which of these observations are actually true (in the
objective, ideal sense). At best, these discussions involve a
considerable degree of subjectivity, and decisions regard-
ing which associations are really believable and warrant
some form of intervention are reached in a manner resem-
bling an informal and rather undemocratic consensus.
Even conceptually more appealing approaches such as
multiple bias modelling rely on some consensus about
the prior distributions assumed for bias corrections. Thus,
when asked whether smoking causes lung cancer, an hon-
est epidemiologist is left merely with the following as a
viable response: "I can tell you that smoking two packs a day
for N years increases your risk of lung cancer by 10 times". In
fact, this is clearly an oversimplification, and they would
actually be better off saying: "I can tell you with 95 percent
certainty that smoking two packs a day for N years increases
your risk of lung cancer by between A and B times". But even
this is not satisfactory, and one of these two would be
preferable: "I can tell you with 95 percent certainty that smok-
ing two packs a day for N years increases your risk of lung can-
cer by between A and B times, assuming that there is no
systematic error in my observations" or "I can tell you with 95
percent certainty that smoking two packs a day for N years
increases your risk of lung cancer by between A and B times,
and I have tried to correct for biases C, D and E using prior dis-
tributions S, T and U, which I believe (though I cannot be cer-
tain) are rational and exhaustive". By this time, the enquirer
will probably have regretted asking the question in the
first place and, while puffing away at their cigarette,
poured themselves a stiff whisky too.
The problem is that to describe such processes accurately
requires the use of very unwieldy language that is not only
linguistically unappealing, but also unfamiliar to most of
those who would have an interest in whether smoking
causes lung cancer. This is well known to any student of
introductory statistics who has grappled with statements
such as "There is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypoth-
esis". All the goodwill in the world and desire for transpar-
ency will not change this fact. It is rather ironic that the
field that is best placed to identify adverse effects on peo-
ple's health is probably the worst-suited for communicat-
ing them. This is hardly surprising, for the perspective
from which we deliver such statements differs markedly
from the perspective of those receiving them. Thus, when
the honest epidemiologist asserts that "I can tell you that
smoking two packs a day for N years increases your risk of lung
cancer by 10 times", they are reporting an association
obtained within a very specific context that has to do with
the way in which their study was designed, the individuals
selected to participate in the study, how data were col-
lected and analyzed, issues of bias and confounding, and
our knowledge of statistical concepts. When confronted
with such a statement, however, an individual might wish
to raise some more pointed questions, such as, for exam-
ple, "How likely is it that this statement is true for me". The
honest epidemiologist now has no recourse, for this is not
a question that they can answer. We can, of course, say
that for some individuals the probability may be exactly 0
and that for others it may be exactly 1 (see Appendix Foot-
note 3). But here is the crux: while Lipton and Ødegaard
favour such statements because they are more accurate,
this is only the case within a very specific context, that of
epidemiologists conducting the science of epidemiology.
To the end user of such information, however, it is this
sort of statement that can be misleading, because there is
no way in which we can say that it is true for any individ-
ual, at least not without calling on some abstract idea of
an "average" individual. Yet while epidemiologists like to
elevate the term "cause" to a philosophical and mythical
realm, as used in everyday life, it has many appealing lin-
guistic qualities. If I were to walk ten minutes away from
my office (to get away from the concentration of epidemi-
ologists), randomly stop people on the street and ask
them if they think smoking "causes" lung cancer, I expect
that most of them would say yes. I also expect that most
would interpret the term "cause" in a probabilistic man-
ner, recognizing that not everybody who smokes develops
lung cancer, and that not everybody who develops lung
cancer is a smoker. I imagine that some will even recog-
nize that among smokers who develop lung cancer, it is
not necessarily true to say that it was smoking that led to
their illness. The common use of the word "cause" thus
encapsulates all the oft-recited qualities of partiality,
necessity and sufficiency, while imparting at least some
qualitative notions of statistical uncertainty.
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By maintaining abstract ideals of objective and unattaina-
ble causes, we do a great disservice to our field and those
whose interests we aim to protect. The idea of the honest
(if not necessarily objective) epidemiologist entrusting
others with their carefully observed and qualified associa-
tional statements is, to my mind, not entirely satisfactory,
because those who can most benefit from that informa-
tion are not necessarily well equipped to interpret it. The
statement "X causes Y" imparts a sense of conviction – that
considering all the available observations, with all their
qualifications, our most reasonable interpretation is that,
in a real if not necessarily ideal sense, X does indeed cause
Y, to an extent that something should be done about it. To
shy behind associational statements, though accurate and
transparent, is to shun this sense of social responsibility –
that we, as gatherers, processers and interpreters of data,
should be compelled to act based upon our observations,
and not merely leave them to the interpretations of others
whose judgement is perhaps no better than our own. The
problem still remains of when and by what criteria we
consider evidence to be sufficient to warrant action, and
this will be an on-going debate, one that will additionally
involve politics, economics and social values, and in
which epidemiologists should undoubtedly be increas-
ingly involved. Whether we call them "causes" or "roses"
is, to a large extent, a moot point. There is, however, no
word in the English language, or in any of the languages
with which I am familiar, to describe an association for
which there is sufficient evidence to warrant some form of
intervention. Perhaps epidemiologists should invent one.
For those bourgeoning students of introductory statistics,
however, it will be depressing to hear that we can never
really know that we are right in ascribing causal associa-
tions. Despite our best intentions and qualifications (and
at the risk of sounding like a refutationist), at best all we
can say is that so far we haven't been not right. But in the
greater scheme of things, epidemiologists can only ever be
wrong.
Competing interests




Lipton and Ødegaard use the term "real" to describe met-
aphysical, objective truth. I use the term here throughout
the text to describe our everyday world, referring to objec-
tive truths as "ideals".
Footnote 2
I refer to "accuracy and precision in describing our obser-
vations" in the sense of our statements about associations
being more accurate and precise descriptions of our obser-
vations, rather than in the sense of them being necessarily
true (in the objective, ideal sense).
Footnote 3
So as not to exclude the stochasticists among us, I should
also add here that for some individuals, perhaps even for
most individuals, the probability might be somewhere
between zero and one.
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